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PUTTING THE REINS ON AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE LIABILITY: 
WHY HORSE ACCIDENTS ARE THE BEST COMMON LAW 
ANALOGY 
David King* 
Autonomous vehicles raise new liability questions on the road 
because the vehicles themselves can act negligently, independent of 
the human driver’s intentions. For now, these liability questions are 
expected to be answered through the incremental common law 
system, rather than by legislation. This means courts will draw 
analogies and distinctions between autonomous vehicle accidents 
and pre-existing case law precedent. What courts analogize 
autonomous vehicle accidents with is likely to have a significant 
effect on liability rules that determine the responsibilities of drivers, 
manufacturers, and others. 
Numerous theories have been proffered on what courts can or 
should analogize autonomous vehicles with for liability purposes. 
These include analogies with elevators, autopilot systems, and 
human beings. Each of these analogy theories have some merit. 
However, comparing autonomous vehicles to transportation by 
horse is a superior, yet overlooked, analogy to autonomous vehicles 
for liability purposes. Horses and autonomous vehicles can both 
perceive and interpret the world around them, then engage in 
dangerous maneuvers as a result of misunderstanding their 
environment. This Recent Development explores the horse analogy 
theory through the lens of different legal doctrines, such as 
instrumentality of harm, assumption of the risk, and product 
liability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Automated vehicles are a form of personalized transportation 
whereby at least one critical function of the vehicle’s control is 
delegated to a computer.1 Typically, the vehicle uses sensors, lasers, 
cameras, and GPS to interpret its surroundings and make decisions 
about its maneuvers.2 For example, an autonomous vehicle may 
recognize pedestrians, cars, and bicyclists, then drive safely around 
them.3 Tesla’s self-driving cars use a radar and a camera device to 
see imminent dangers in front of the driver.4 Then, the Tesla 
automatically applies the brakes when necessary to avoid a collision 
or at least reduce the speed of impact.5 A Tesla also has sensors all 
around the car to collect data about the path of the car’s lane and the 
                                               
 1 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF 
POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 3 (2017) [hereinafter NHTSA, 
PRELIM. STATEMENT], https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/ 
pdf/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2017). 
 2 Id.  
 3 Jeffrey R. Zohn, When Robots Attack: How Should the Law Handle Self-
driving Cars That Cause Damages, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 461, 481 
(2015). 
 4 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., AUTOMATIC VEHICLE 
CONTROL SYSTEMS 2–4 (2017) [hereinafter NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION], 
https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2016/INCLA-PE16007-7876.PDF (last visited 
Sep 18, 2017). 
 5 Id. 
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location of nearby vehicles.6 The car adjusts speed and direction to 
ensure a safe distance from other vehicles.7 
The concept of a self-driving car was first introduced by General 
Motors at the 1939 World Fair.8 The Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (“DARPA”) rapidly increased technology 
development by holding annual competitions where autonomous 
vehicles attempted to complete an obstacle course.9 Over time, new 
advancements in autonomous technology have allowed self-driving 
cars to operate safely in an increasingly diverse range of 
circumstances.10 Now, autonomous vehicles are beginning to enter 
the consumer market for the first time.11 The National Highway 
Traffic Administration said this is the beginning of “a historic 
turning point for automotive travel.”12 However, questions about the 
legal implications of self-driving cars loom over this dramatic shift 
in transportation.13 
A. Legislation 
Forty-one states have introduced autonomous vehicle legislation 
since 2012,14 but the pending SELF DRIVE Act15 may be the most 
                                               
 6 Id. at 4. 
 7 Id. 
 8 PC MAGAZINE, Definition of: Driverless Car, PC MAGAZINE: 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/56628/driverless-
car (last visited Oct. 31, 2017). 
 9 See id. 
 10 See Scott Le Vine, Alireza Zolfaghari, & John Polak, Autonomous Cars: The 
Tension Between Occupant Experience and Intersection Capacity, TRANSP. 
RESEARCH PART C 1, 1 (Mar. 2015). 
 11 See id. 
 12 NHTSA, PRELIM. STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 1. 
 13 Clifford Winston & Fed Mannering, Implementing Technology to Improve 
Public Highway Performance: A Leapfrog Technology from the Private Sector Is 
Going to Be Necessary, 3 ECON. TRANSP. 158, 164 (2014). 
 14 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Autonomous Vehicles: 
Self-driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enacted-
legislation.aspx (last updated Oct. 23, 2017). 
 15 SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. (as passed by House of 
Representatives, Sept. 7, 2017). 
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significant legislative activity for autonomous vehicles to date.16 The 
SELF DRIVE Act has been passed by the House of Representatives 
and is now in front of the Senate for consideration.17 If passed, the 
Act will allow up to 100,000 autonomous vehicles on public roads 
for testing and data-collection purposes.18 The Act requires that the 
federal government research, test, and certify the safety of 
autonomous vehicle products, pre-empting any contrary state law.19 
Meanwhile, it leaves “registration, licensing, driving education and 
training, insurance, law enforcement, crash investigations, safety 
and emissions inspections” within the authority of the states.20 
The media has hailed the SELF DRIVE Act as a bipartisan 
effort21 that lifts barriers to the advancement of autonomous 
vehicles.22 Modern developments in self-driving cars may produce 
significant economic and social benefits.23 Autonomous vehicles 
could avoid the 94% of car accidents caused by human error,24 
                                               
 16 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 14 (showing 
that almost all legislation passed so far is for autonomous vehicle testing or to 
empower a regulatory agency to develop substantive law). 
 17 Cecilia Kang, Self-driving Cars’ Prospects Rise with Vote by House, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/self-
driving-cars-prospects-rise-with-vote-by-congress.html?mcubz=1. 
 18 H.R. 3388 § 6(3). 
 19 Id. §§ 3, 4, 7. 
 20 Id. § 3. 
 21 See, e.g., Aarian Marshall, Congress Unites (Gasp) to Spread Self-driving 
Cars Across America, WIRED, (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.wired.com/ 
story/congress-self-driving-car-law-bill/; Tony Romm, The House Approved a 
Bill to Put More Self-Driving Cars on U.S. Roads — But the Senate will be 
Another Story, RECODE, https://www.recode.net/2017/9/6/16259306/house-
senate-self-driving-driverless-cars-autonomous (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 22 Kang, supra note 17. 
 23 See generally Adam Thierer & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to 
Intelligent Vehicles & Driverless Cars, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 339, 339 
(2015) (advocating against any legislation that may slow the advancement of 
autonomous vehicle technology.). 
 24 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., CRITICAL REASONS FOR 
CRASHES INVESTIGATED IN THE NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION 
SURVEY 1 (2015), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ 
ViewPublication/812115. 
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saving up to 30,000 lives per year in the United States alone.25 One 
day, society may consider it morally reprehensible to drive a car 
manually when automated cars—purged of human error—reduce 
dangers to other drivers.26 Additionally, self-driving cars are 
expected to improve traffic congestion, fuel usage, parking, mobility 
for the disabled, and productivity for drivers.27 Autonomous vehicles 
may one day be the commonplace norm for personalized 
transportation.28 Many academics, journalists, and consumers have 
called upon legislators to clear legal obstacles that may hinder 
progress towards that future.29 
Uncertainty about liability issues is one such obstacle.30 
Autonomous vehicles will inevitably be involved in at least some 
accidents.31 These accidents raise new liability questions as to who 
will be responsible for the car’s negligence.32 Answers to these 
questions could influence how much control of the vehicle a 
manufacturer leaves with drivers, who buys insurance, and how 
many people buy autonomous vehicles.33 According to the 
Department of Transportation, “[r]ules and laws allocating tort 
                                               
 25 Janet Fleetwood, Public Health, Ethics, and Autonomous Vehicles, 107 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 532, 532 (2017). 
 26 See generally Robert Sparrow & Mark Howard, When Human Beings Are 
Like Drunk Robots: Driverless Vehicles, Ethics, and the Future of Transport, 80 
TRANSP. RES. PART C 206 (2017) (analogizing manual driving with drunk driving 
in that it increases risks to others on the road). 
 27 Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 23, at 340. 
 28 See id. at 339. 
 29 See generally, e.g., id. 
 30 Winston & Mannering, supra note 13, at 164. 
 31 Justin Thomas, Comment, Putting Programmers in the Driver’s Seat: State 
Tort Systems Applied to Autonomous Automobiles, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
553, 554 (2016); Damien A. Riehl, Car Minus Driver: Autonomous Vehicles 
Driving Regulation, Liability, and Policy, BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 2016, at 21. 
 32 Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 23, at 360. 
 33 Id. at 361–62 (“The rationale for such legislative intervention would be 
supported by the fact that autonomous vehicles represent a socially beneficial 
technology that may be hindered by real or perceived liability concerns.”). 
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liability could have a significant effect on both consumer acceptance 
of [automated vehicles] and their rate of deployment.”34 
It is possible future federal or state legislation will limit or alter 
tort liability.35 Legislators have sometimes limited liability when the 
magnitude of liability threatens to prevent a desirable product or 
service from flourishing.36 Autonomous vehicles could be very 
expensive to produce if manufacturers were exposed to the risk of 
litigation for any accident the car is involved in throughout the life 
of each vehicle.37 
While the argument for legislative limits or exceptions to 
manufacturer liability has some rationality, such legislation for new 
technologies is the exception, not the norm.38 Additionally, the 
SELF DRIVE Act implies a legislative intent to leave autonomous 
vehicle liability to the common law tort system.39 The Act’s only 
content on liability reads as follows: 
“(e) COMMON LAW LIABILITY.- 
(1) IN GENERAL. Compliance with a motor vehicle safety 
standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person 
from liability at common law. 
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to preempt common law claims.”40 
For the time being, liability rules for autonomous vehicles will likely 
be determined by the courts through the common law system. 
                                               
 34 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED 
VEHICLES POLICY 46 (2016), https://www.transportation.gov/ 
sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20guidance%20PDF.pdf. 
 35 Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between 
Autonomous Vehicles & the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 
1337 (2012) (“Another line of defense for autonomous vehicle manufacturers 
would be legislation at either the federal or state level that would protect against, 
or limit, liability.”). 
 36 See id. at 1337–38. 
 37 See id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 H.R. 3388 § 3(2)(e). 
 40 Id. 
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B. Common Law 
The SELF DRIVE Act leaves liability rules up to state common 
law,41 but no common law precedent has been established for 
autonomous vehicles.42 How tort common law applies to owners, 
drivers, manufacturers, or others in the context of an autonomous 
vehicle is unclear.43 Many liability rules will likely develop 
incrementally over time through the common law system and may 
depend on the facts of each individual case or the jurisdiction of the 
accident.44 Additionally, the United States Department of 
Transportation’s report on a fatal autonomous vehicle accident in 
Florida provides some guidance from an administrative agency.45 
What common law precedent courts analogize with self-driving 
cars will likely be critical to autonomous vehicle liability rules. One 
analogy theory suggests that courts could compare autonomous 
vehicles to elevators, which used to be operated manually but later 
became more automated.46 This analogy would result in autonomous 
vehicle owners being responsible for most injuries, even when 
someone else is driving, because owners must ensure the vehicle is 
in safe operating condition.47 Another analogy theory suggests that 
                                               
 41 Id. 
 42 Marchant & Lindor, supra note 35, at 1324 (“Not surprisingly, there has not 
been any reported personal injury litigation regarding these products to date.”). 
 43 Thomas, supra note 31, at 554 (“The law regarding autonomous vehicle 
liability, however, is unclear.”). 
 44 Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 23, at 361 (“Legal standards here could 
evolve gradually through the common law as they have for traditional automobiles 
and many other technologies.”). 
 45 See generally NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4. 
 46 Kyle Colonna, Autonomous Cars & Tort Liability, 4 CASE W. RESERVE J.L. 
TECH. & INTERNET 81, 91–92 (2012). 
 47 26 AM. JUR. 2D Elevators and Escalators § 13 (2017) (stating property 
owners are liable for defective construction, negligent operation, or poor 
maintenance of an elevator, unless close inspection would not have revealed the 
danger); Zohn, supra note 3 (“The person inside an elevator at the time of the 
accident cannot be held liable unless they are exceptionally negligent.”);  K. 
Krasnow Waterman & Matthew T. Henshon, Imagine the Ram-If-Ications 
Assessing Liability for Robotics-based Car Accidents, ABA SciTech Law., at 15 
(Spring 2009), at 15 (2009) (“[E]levator lawsuits almost always arise from injury 
to occupants of a malfunctioning elevator, not due to injuries to other elevators or 
the persons riding inside them.”). 
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courts analogize autonomous vehicles to autopilot systems.48 This 
approach would result in drivers being liable for most accidents, 
because of their misuse of, or excessive reliance on, the car’s 
autonomous features.49 Finally, another proposed theory analogizes 
an autonomous vehicle to a human driver by proposing a 
“reasonable car” standard.50 Under this analogy, the manufacturer 
would be liable any time an autonomous vehicle does not act 
reasonably.51 
This Recent Development argues that the most compelling 
analogy theory for liability purposes is to compare autonomous 
vehicles to transportation by horses. Horses and self-driving cars are 
both property owned and operated by humans, but with a mind of 
their own. Both horses and autonomous vehicles can perceive their 
surroundings, misinterpret the danger of objects or events around 
them, and make dangerous maneuvers not intended by their human 
driver.52 The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part II reviews the pre-
existing theories courts will analogize autonomous vehicles with, 
namely elevators, autopilot systems, or human beings. Part III 
introduces the horse analogy and discusses how it would apply to 
autonomous vehicles. Additionally, it examines the horse analogy 
through the lens of different liability doctrines, such as product 
liability, imputed passenger liability, and assumption of the risk. 
                                               
 48 Marchant & Lindor, supra note 35, at 1324–25. 
 49 Dylan LeValley, Comment, Autonomous Vehicle Liability-Application of 
Common Carrier Liability, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. SUPRA 5, 9 (2013) (“[M]ost 
litigation over liability arising from an accident involving an autopilot has 
determined that human error by the operators, not malfunctioning of the 
autopilots, was the cause of the accident.”). 
 50 See generally K.C. Webb, Products Liability & Autonomous Vehicles: Who’s 
Driving Whom?, 23 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 34 (2016), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/2017/05/13/volume23_issue4_webb/ (advocating for the 
reasonable car standard based on an analogy with human drivers). 
 51 Id. at 34. 
 52 Compare Neal Boudette, Tesla’s Self-driving System Cleared in Deadly 
Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
01/19/business/tesla-model-s-autopilot-fatal-crash.html?mcubz=1 (reporting on a 
self-driving Tesla that saw a truck, failed to understand it was a dangerous object, 
and drove straight into it.), with Alpha Constr. Co. v. Branham, 337 S.W.2d 790 
(Ky. 1960) (discussing a case where a horse heard noises from a truck, failed to 
understand it was not dangerous, and jumped into the street in fright.). 
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II. CURRENT ANALOGY THEORIES 
Academics have proffered numerous theories about what 
common law precedent courts will use to analogize with 
autonomous vehicles.53 This section will discuss pre-existing 
analogy theories for (1) elevators, (2) autopilot systems, and (3) 
human drivers. 
A. Elevators 
One of the more popular analogy theories that courts could 
compare autonomous vehicles to is elevators.54 Elevators can be 
thought of as a vehicle that transports people vertically.55 They used 
to be operated manually, but at some point became more 
automated.56 Many elevators even engage in a type of intelligent 
traffic flow, whereby each elevator in a set chooses which floor to 
go to based on the direction passengers are heading.57 A passenger 
on an elevator is not expected to oversee the elevator’s “driving” 
decisions.58 Passengers merely press a button to reach their 
destination.59 
Barring extraordinary circumstances, elevator users are not 
liable for injuries they suffer in an elevator60 because it is difficult 
                                               
 53 See, e.g., Colonna, supra note 46, at 86 (mentioning biotechnology, autopilot, 
elevators, autonomous trains, and robots); Marchant & Lindor, supra note 35, at 
1324–25 (mentioning autopilot, cruise control, and industrial robots); Webb, 
supra note 50, at 33–37, 48 (mentioning elevators, autopilot, automotive 
technology, and humans); Zohn, supra note 3, at 481–84 (mentioning elevators 
and autopilot). 
 54 Colonna, supra note 46, at 86; Webb, supra note 50, at 33–37; Zohn, supra 
note 3, at 480 (“[The] two most analogous technologies are elevators and autopilot 
on airplanes and ships.”). 
 55 Colonna, supra note 46, at 102. 
 56 Id. at 91–92. 
 57 Waterman & Henshon, supra note 47, at 3 (“[I]n recent years, smart 
technology has been introduced to create efficient traffic flow in a bank 
of elevators.”). 
 58 See Zach Matthews & Christopher K. Jones, Defending the First Wave: 
Autonomous Trucking and the Death of Driver Negligence?, 57 No. 12 DRI For 
Def. 59 at 61 (noting that since the 1970s, elevators have been almost entirely 
computer controlled). 
 59 Waterman & Henshon, supra note 47, at 15. 
 60 Zohn, supra note 3, at 483. 
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for passengers to be negligent while inside a self-driving box they 
have little control over.61 Accidents almost always occur because of 
a malfunction of the elevator.62 The landlord that owns and controls 
the elevator is liable for most injuries63 because owners are expected 
to inspect, maintain, and repair their elevators to ensure safe 
operating condition.64 
In most states, the owner of an elevator has a heightened duty of 
care as a common carrier.65 A common carrier is a person or 
organization that transports human passengers as a service.66 
Common carriers have a duty of utmost care, rather than that of a 
reasonable person, because passengers place their body into the 
common carrier’s exclusive control, entrusting the service’s 
locomotives and procedures with their safety.67 Although it has been 
argued that autonomous vehicle manufacturers would be common 
carriers under the elevator analogy,68 common carrier liability 
attaches to the owner of an elevator, not the manufacturer.69 Under 
the elevator analogy, the owner of an autonomous vehicle would be 
liable in most accidents for failing to ensure the safety of occupants 
in their vehicle, even if the owner was not “driving” at the time an 
accident occurred. 
                                               
 61 See generally Mark A. Franklin, California’s Extension of Common Carrier 
Liability to Roller Coasters & Similar Devices: An Examination of Gomez v. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles, 34 W. ST. U. L. REV. 29 (2006) (stating that the 
justification for shifting liability to common carriers like elevator operators is that 
passengers have little control over the vehicle and rely completely on the common 
carrier for their safety). 
 62 Matthews & Jones, supra note 58, at 61 (“elevator lawsuits almost always 
arise from injury to occupants of a malfunctioning elevator, not due to injuries to 
other elevators or the persons riding inside them”). 
 63 50 N.Y. JUR. 2D Elevators and Escalators § 23 (2017). 
 64 26 AM. JUR. 2D Elevators and Escalators § 10 (2017).  
 65 Matthews & Jones, supra note 58, at 61. 
 66 See generally Franklin, supra note 61. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See generally LeValley, supra note 49 (arguing in part IV that autonomous 
vehicle manufacturers should owe a duty similar to that of common carriers). 
 69 Willoughby v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 87 S.W.3d 509, 512 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2002); Matthews & Jones, supra note 58, at 61; see also Tim Higgins, The 
End of Car Ownership, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-end-of-car-ownership-1498011001. 
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In a distant future, autonomous vehicles that are analogous to 
elevators may be commonplace. Individual car ownership could 
fade in favor of cars owned by businesses and provided as a 
service.70 For a small fee, users could tap a button on their 
smartphone app to hail an autonomous vehicle to their location, get 
in the car, and be transported to their destination.71 This could all be 
done in a self-driving car that lacks any meaningful controls or 
driver responsibilities for the human passenger.72 Autonomous 
vehicles could even operate on a track, like elevators do.73 
However, the elevator analogy theory relies on a vision for 
autonomous vehicles in a distant future. Unlike elevators, personal 
autonomous vehicles are expected to require some degree of human 
control and oversight for the foreseeable future.74 Experts predict it 
will take ten to twenty years for autonomous vehicles to be able to 
drive themselves safely under most circumstances.75 To provide 
autonomous vehicle transportation as a service—shifting ownership 
of vehicles from individuals to common carriers—would require 
fully automated technology.76 Most research predicts this level of 
automation will not make a significant presence on the road until the 
                                               
 70 Id. See generally Daniel J. Fagnant & Kara M. Kockelman, The Travel and 
Environmental Implications of Shared Autonomous Vehicles, Using Agent-based 
Model Scenarios, 40 TRANSP. RES. PART C 1–13 (2014). 
 71 Higgins, supra note 69. 
 72 Douglas Ernst, Ford: Autonomous Cars with No Steering Wheel, Gas and 
Break Pedals by 2021, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/16/ford-autonomous-cars-
with-no-steering-wheel-gas-an/ (last visited Nov 2, 2017). 
 73 Tina Amirtha, Forget Self-driving Cars: Here’s How Driverless Trains Are 
Moving Ahead, ZDNET (April 6, 2017), http://www.zdnet.com/article/forget-self-
driving-cars-heres-how-driverless-trains-are-moving-ahead/ (last visited Nov 2, 
2017). 
 74 Mica R. Endsley, From Here to Autonomy, 59 HUMAN FACTORS 5, 21 (2017). 
 75 See generally Zia Wadud, Don MacKenzie, & Paul Leiby, Help or 
Hindrance? The Travel, Energy and Carbon Impacts of Highly Automated 
Vehicles, 86 TRANSP. RES. Part A 5 (2016). 
 76 Id. at 3, 7, 10 (discussing transportation provided as a service through 
autonomous vehicles owned by the service, once level 4 automation (complete 
automation) is achieved). 
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2030s or 2040s.77 Furthermore, autonomous vehicles are generally 
being developed to understand and respond to the world around 
them, not to operate on a track.78 The elevator analogy may be 
compelling for futurists, but no sensible consumer, manufacturer, or 
other party has a practical need to speculate about liability rules 
several decades in the future. 
Also, even in a distant future where autonomous vehicles are 
analogous to elevators, the analogy would have little utility. If 
autonomous vehicle transportation is provided as a service and the 
locomotive is automated with no meaningful control by the driver, 
the service provider (not the manufacturer) would be a common 
carrier.79 The passenger, lacking any significant driving 
responsibilities, would be subjected to the provider’s exclusive 
control.80 A novel type of vehicle (self-driving cars) would not cloud 
common carrier status.81 In a future where autonomous vehicle 
transportation is provided as a service by a common carrier, it would 
be much more practical to analogize the service provider to any 
number of other common carriers, such as taxis or autonomous 
trains, rather than elevators.82 
Furthermore, the elevator analogy does not conform to a sensible 
distribution of liability in foreseeable autonomous vehicle accident 
                                               
 77 Prateek Bansal & Kara M. Kockelman, Forecasting Americans’ Long-term 
Adoption of Connected and Autonomous Vehicle Technologies, 95 TRANSP. 
RESEARCH PART A 49–63 (2017). 
 78 See e.g. Zohn, supra note 3, at 481 (“During these test drives, the cars have 
successfully navigated jaywalking pedestrians, cars lurching out of hidden 
driveways, double-parked delivery trucks, and bicyclists who were not following 
street laws.”). 
 79 See generally Franklin, supra note 61, at 33–37 (discussing the extension of 
common carrier liability to rollercoaster operators in California). 
 80 See id. at 36. 
 81 11 TERESA J. FARRIS, PAUL R. KEANE & RAYMOND J. KENNEY, 
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE: MOTOR VEHICLE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8:2 (4th ed. 
2017), Westlaw MAPRAC (“[M]eager evidence is sufficient to establish its status 
as [a common carrier]”). 
 82 Colonna, supra note 46, at 102 (“Autonomous trains are analogous to 
elevators, except that autonomous trains operate on a horizontal axis instead of a 
vertical axis.”); FARRIS ET AL., supra note 81, § 8:2 (“An owner-operator of 
taxicabs may properly be regarded as a common carrier of passengers for hire[.]”). 
Dec. 2017] Autonomous Vehicle Liability 139 
scenarios. It is rare for an elevator passenger to be negligent.83 In 
contrast, human drivers are “[a]t the heart of safety concerns” in 
autonomous vehicles.84 For example, a human driver may fail to take 
over manual control when prompted, may tell the vehicle to exceed 
the speed limit, or may use the self-driving features on a road for 
which they are not intended.85 
Finally, the elevator analogy does not conform to the 
Department of Transportation’s guidance based on a fatal 
autonomous vehicle accident in Florida.86 The elevator analogy 
would imply passengers have no responsibilities as they are 
transported in a common carrier’s self-driving box. In the report, the 
Department of Transportation mentioned the “driver” 
approximately 75 times.87 It pointed out that the driver did not pay 
attention, did not follow the car’s instructions, and took no action to 
avoid collision.88 Elevator users do not have any analogous duties. 
The report said manufacturers could be responsible for an accident 
caused by foreseeable abuse of the autonomous vehicle by the 
owner.89 This is in stark contrast to the common carrier liability 
                                               
 83 Matthews & Jones, supra note 58, at 61 (“[E]levator lawsuits almost always 
arise from injury to occupants of a malfunctioning elevator, not due to injuries to 
other elevators or the persons riding inside them.”). 
 84 Francesca M. Favarò et al., Examining Accident Reports Involving 
Autonomous Vehicles in California, 12 PLOS ONE e0184952 at 2 (September 20, 
2017), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371 
/journal.pone.0184952&type=printable. 
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ignoring the car’s warnings, and not reading the owner’s manual); David 
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 86 NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4, at 1. 
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elevators impart to owners of the vehicle to protect their passengers 
against foreseeable harms.90 
Someday autonomous vehicles may be more analogous to a 
common carrier, leaving almost all liability exposure with the 
business that is providing a transportation service. However, by then 
there may also be more legislative controls, and it would be more 
sensible to analogize autonomous vehicles with taxis or autonomous 
trains than the counter-intuitive elevator analogy. Speculating about 
a distant future can be an interesting intellectual exercise, but is not 
a recipe for practical and actionable analysis. 
B. Autopilot 
Another analogy theory is that courts could compare 
autonomous vehicles to the autopilot systems used in ships and 
planes.91 This analogy addresses some of the issues of the elevator 
theory. Autopilot involves partially automated control of a vehicle, 
with oversight from a human pilot.92 Most autopilot features observe 
and respond to a dynamic environment, such as changes in wind, 
other vessels, and wildlife,93 rather than operating on a track as an 
elevator does. 
In most cases, pilots and their employers are liable for accidents 
involving autopilot systems.94 Technically, liability attaches to the 
                                               
 90 See 6 WASH. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
WASHINGTON PRACTICE: PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS WPI 100.03 (6th ed. 
2013), Westlaw WAPRAC; 4 HENRY P. TRAWICK, JR., FLORIDA PLEADING AND 
PRACTICE FORMS § 33:19 (2017), Westlaw FL-PP (stating that a common carrier 
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 91 Zohn, supra note 3, at 481–82. 
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autonomous technology.”); Webb, supra note 50, at 26 (“Nor do AVs fit well into 
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vigilance and intervention. Requiring human vigilance of AVs is incomparable to 
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 93 Zohn, supra note 3, at 481. 
 94 LeValley, supra note 49, at 9 (“[M]ost litigation over liability arising from 
an accident involving an autopilot has determined that human error by the 
operators, not malfunctioning of the autopilots, was the cause of the accident.”). 
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manufacturer of the autopilot system, unless there is evidence of 
negligence by the pilot.95 In practice, there is almost always enough 
evidence of pilot negligence to shift liability.96 For example, pilots 
can be liable for using a boat’s autopilot system in shallow water for 
which it was not intended, or for loading an airplane with 
imbalanced cargo which the autopilot could not handle.97 Most 
airplane autopilot accidents are caused by misuse of autopilot during 
take-off or landing, where use of autopilot is discouraged.98 
Manufacturers do not have a duty to train pilots on how to use their 
autopilot software safely.99 Applying the autopilot analogy to 
autonomous vehicles would impart liability on drivers in most cases, 
such as for using the autonomous features incorrectly, failing to 
learn to use the autonomous features safely, or not addressing the 
autonomous features’ limitations. 
Autopilot is a stronger analogy than elevators, but also has some 
substantial distinctions from autonomous vehicles. The level of 
attention and training expected of a professional, licensed pilot is 
not comparable to what is expected from the average automobile 
driver.100 Studies show consumers do not perform well at 
maintaining vigilance over long periods of time in a task that is not 
substantially interactive.101 Additionally, most autopilot technology 
on ships and planes is intended to keep the vehicle on a straight path 
determined by the pilot or make slight changes along the path 
without getting pushed off-course by wind or current.102 In contrast, 
                                               
 95 Zohn, supra note 3, at 481. 
 96 Id. (“Historically, the majority of autopilot accidents have been caused by 
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 97 Id. at 481–82. 
 98 Id. at 481. 
 99 Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 582 (Minn. 2012). 
 100 Zohn, supra note 3, at 482. 
 101 Webb, supra note 50, at 26 (“Ergonomic research indicates human brains 
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 102 See Colonna, supra note 46, at 94–95 (“Most autopilots work by making 
slight changes in the heading of the plane and do not require significant 
adaptations.”); LeValley, supra note 49, at 10. 
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an autonomous vehicle might make discrete choices to stop, go, or 
turn and respond to the vehicles around it.103 
The autopilot analogy conforms to some of the guidance 
provided by the Department of Transportation in its report about a 
fatal autonomous vehicle accident in Florida.104 However, the report 
is aligned with the outcome of applying the autopilot analogy only 
because the driver’s negligence was extraordinary. In the Florida 
accident, the driver was watching a Harry Potter movie105 and 
ignored repeated warnings from the car to take over manual 
control.106 The autonomous vehicle hit a truck that was visible for 
seven seconds, yet the driver made no effort to avoid collision.107 
Additionally, the driver was using the autonomous features on city 
streets, whereas it was only intended for freeway use.108 The 
autopilot analogy makes sense for this accident but becomes less 
applicable in a more nuanced case. 
For example, in autopilot case law, a pilot can be liable for 
improperly loading a plane.109 However, the Department of 
Transportation has found that manufacturers can be liable for 
accidents caused by foreseeable misuse of the product by the 
owner.110 This indicates that autonomous vehicles can shift some 
liability away from the amateur driver and onto the manufacturer, as 
compared to autopilot cases. The Department of Transportation 
report described some potential duties of autonomous vehicle 
manufacturers that included alerting the driver of limitations of the 
autopilot system, developing a method for ensuring the driver is 
paying attention, minimizing the potential for confusion about 
whether autopilot is engaged, and considering limiting functionality 
                                               
 103 LeValley, supra note 49, at 10. 
 104 See generally NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4, at 1, 5–6. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Shepardson, supra note 85. 
 107 Id. 
 108 NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4, at 4 (“The Tesla Model S 
owner’s manual states that TACC ‘is primarily intended for driving on dry, 
straight roads, such as highways and freeways. It should not be used on city 
streets.’”). 
 109 Zohn, supra note 3, at 481–82. 
 110 NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4, at 10. 
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on roads for which autopilot is inappropriate.111 These duties differ 
from the more limited responsibilities of autopilot system 
manufacturers, who are selling to professional pilots.112 
Under the autopilot analogy theory, most liability would be 
given to autonomous vehicle drivers for misusing the autopilot or 
failing to recognize its limitations. In comparison, autonomous 
vehicle accidents will likely involve a higher burden on 
manufacturers, who cannot expect their customers to be professional 
drivers. 
C. Reasonable Car 
Another analogy theory is that the courts could compare 
autonomous vehicles with human drivers, creating a reasonable car 
standard.113 The reasonable car standard could be evaluated by 
taking data the autonomous vehicle collects just before an accident 
and evaluating whether most autonomous vehicles would have 
avoided the collision in similar circumstances.114 The standard of 
reasonableness would adjust as the average performance of 
autonomous vehicles improves with technology.115 
This analogy would conform to a common theory that the 
proliferation of autonomous vehicles will result in giving 
manufacturers, rather than drivers, liability for most accidents.116 
One journal went as far as to say autonomous vehicles will be “the 
death of driver negligence.”117 However, the reasonable car theory 
does leave room for a negligent driver to misuse a reasonable car.118 
The reasonable person doctrine is the basis for the reasonable 
car standard. The reasonable person is an abstract “mythical 
                                               
 111 Id. at 5–6. 
 112 Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 583 (Minn. 2012). 
 113 Webb, supra note 50, at 34. 
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creation” that represents a “community ideal.”119 Sometimes it can 
be reversible error to compare the reasonable person to an actual 
human being.120 The reasonable person knows how human beings 
behave and possesses widely known knowledge of common 
dangers.121 Often a reasonable person may be framed in the context 
of the “Hand Formula” whereby the jury determines whether the 
risks of the defendant’s actions were reasonable when compared to 
the burden of safeguarding against those risks.122 
This concept does not apply well to autonomous vehicles. First, 
the courts have never applied the reasonable person standard to 
property, even when that property is autonomous. For example, the 
owner of an autonomous living animal, not the animal itself, may be 
subject to the reasonable person standard.123 
Second, the reasonable car standard would be difficult to apply 
to actual accidents, such as the one in Florida.124 There, the vehicle 
did not recognize a white truck against a bright sky and drove 
straight into the truck.125 How would one apply the Hand Formula in 
this scenario? The autonomous vehicle did not weigh the risks 
against the burden of safeguards. Rather, it failed to interpret the 
world around it. In contrast, applying the Learned Hand formula to 
software design choices has robust, legal precedent and established 
law.126 Software designers can be negligent by poorly weighing the 
                                               
 119 Peter N. Swisher, Robert E. Draim & David D. Hudgins, The Objective 
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inconvenience of a safety feature against the risks caused by its 
absence.127 
Third, a reasonable car standard merely introduces a new and 
unnecessary concept that competes with the pre-existing legal 
doctrine of industry custom. Custom in an industry can be an 
important factor in determining the reasonableness of a design 
choice and is based on what reasonable precautions competitors 
have taken.128 The doctrine of industry custom enjoys a long and 
developed history, whereas the reasonable car standard is a novel 
approach that simply reiterates the need to compare the car to those 
manufactured by other brands. 
Most modern products liability cases focus on design defects 
made by human beings.129 The reasonable car theory would be a bold 
departure from pre-existing legal precedent. It would amount to 
abandoning the legal tradition of drawing analogies and distinctions 
from pre-existing precedent, rather than creating new law from the 
bench. 
III. THE HORSE THEORY 
A stronger analogy is to compare autonomous vehicles to horses, 
a much older form of autonomous property that has a long history 
of being used for transportation. Both horses and self-driving cars 
can perceive their environment, misunderstand their surroundings, 
and make dangerous maneuvers, independent of the human 
operator’s will.130 
For example, in Alpha Construction v. Branham, a horse 
walking on the side of a road heard loud noises from a truck, thought 
                                               
 127 Ballman, supra note 126. 
 128 See generally David A. Urban, Custom’s Proper Role in Strict Product. 
Liability Actions Based on Design Defect, 38 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990). 
 129 Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Summary and Comment—Generally, 
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 130 Compare Boudette, supra note 52 (reporting that a self-driving Tesla saw a 
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it was dangerous, got spooked, and galloped into the street.131 In the 
Tesla accident in Florida, the autonomous vehicle saw a white truck 
against a bright sky, though it was not dangerous, and drove straight 
into the truck.132 In both cases, the locomotive failed to make what 
most humans would consider a common-sense interpretation of the 
dangers around them. The vehicles made dangerous maneuvers 
because they lacked adequate intelligence to genuinely understand 
their surroundings. 
Although horses and cars may seem like very different objects 
today, there was a time when it was not so unusual to compare the 
two. In the early 1900s, some people would call cars “a machine 
with a horse like quality” or a “horseless carriage.”133 In 1940, one 
United States Army colonel said: “[a] machine has no life; horses 
have—that is the radical difference.”134 From a liability perspective, 
the transition from horses to cars meant moving from a vehicle with 
a mind of its own, to one that rarely acts against the driver’s orders. 
Autonomous vehicles have not returned “life” to vehicles, but they 
have given vehicles the ability to think and act on their own, which 
is a characteristic more analogous to transportation by horse. It does 
not necessarily make a legal difference that a horse is made of blood 
and bone whereas an autonomous vehicle is made of steel and 
computer boards.135 Perhaps the reason a horse analogy has been 
overlooked is that academics have only considered what technology 
autonomous vehicles could be analogized with.136 
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As with the other analogy theories, the horse analogy has its own 
pitfalls. Horses are widely known for being unpredictable and 
dangerous.137 In contrast, autonomous vehicles are considered safer 
and less erratic than human drivers, in most circumstances.138 In 
some ways, horses are less autonomous than some self-driving cars. 
On a horse, decisions regarding when to stop, go, or turn are 
typically controlled by individual human commands.139 In other 
ways, the horse is more autonomous. The rider of a horse may lose 
complete control,140 whereas an autonomous vehicle may allow the 
human driver to take over at any time.141 Finally, horses probably 
require more skill to ride than autonomous vehicles take to use.142 
For both horses and autonomous vehicles, safety can be improved 
by the rider’s skill and experience.143 
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These differences—the degree of skill, danger, and 
predictability of the vehicle—speak to the degree of precaution 
expected of a reasonable person under the circumstances.144 In this 
way, the horse analogy shares milder forms of the same 
shortcomings of the autopilot analogy: a greater degree of skill and 
oversight expected from the operator of the vehicle. However, since 
greater skills and precaution are expected of pilots than horseback 
riders, the horse analogy is much closer to autonomous vehicles. 
The following sub-sections will further explore the horse 
analogy from the perspective of different parties and legal doctrines. 
A. Other Drivers 
Any number of third parties could be negligent for creating 
circumstances likely to confuse an autonomous vehicle.145 For 
example, a black car driving at night with broken headlights could 
confuse an autonomous vehicle that does not recognize it against a 
dark background.146 There is no analogous equivalent for pilots 
because there are too few planes in the air to create routine visual 
stimuli for an autopilot.147 Autopilot systems may respond to wind 
and wildlife,148 but these obstacles do not have a legal duty to act 
reasonably like other drivers do. Elevators also have no analogous 
case law, because they operate on a track in two directions without 
perceiving, or responding to, their environment.149 
In contrast, case law for horse accidents is more analogous to 
autonomous vehicles, because horses interpret and respond to the 
actions of other drivers. In the early 1900s, cars and horses 
                                               
 144 See LEE S. KREINDLER ET AL., 14 NEW YORK PRACTICE SERIES - NEW YORK 
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frequently shared the road.150 Horse riders and car drivers had equal 
rights to the road, which implied a reciprocal duty for drivers and 
horseback riders not to interfere with each other’s rights to use the 
road safely and reasonably.151 This meant car drivers had a duty to 
exhibit common sense knowledge of noises and maneuvers that may 
trigger erratic behavior in nearby horses.152 For example, if a driver 
notices the car’s approach is causing a horse to act erratically, the 
driver may have to slow down to prevent scaring the horse further 
with the vehicle, mitigating the risk.153 
In Branham, a truck driver going less than 35 miles per hour and 
creating a regular amount of noise was not considered negligent for 
frightening a horse with the vehicle’s approach, causing the horse to 
gallop into the highway.154 There, the court said it is not negligent to 
engage in the ordinary lawful use of a vehicle and the driver had a 
right to presume the horse would act safely.155 The horse’s ears 
perking up was not enough to put the driver on notice that the truck 
was scaring the horse.156 In contrast, in McIntyre v. Orner, a driver 
going only 15 mph near a horse-drawn carriage was liable for 
scaring the horses, causing the carriage to throw the passengers.157 
There, the driver failed to stop his car, even after seeing that it was 
frightening the horses.158 The court said the driver should have 
known cars were “strange objects to horses” and could cause them 
to act erratically.159 
This precedent offers a practical standard from which to evaluate 
the hypothetical discussed earlier in this section. To decide whether 
the driver of a black car with broken headlights was negligent by 
confusing an autonomous vehicle, the court would need to ask: (1) 
whether it was lawful or ordinary use; (2) whether a reasonable 
                                               
 150 See generally McIntyre v. Orner, 166 Ind. 57 N.E. 750 (1906) (discussing 
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person would know a black car with no headlights may cause erratic 
behavior in autonomous vehicles; and (3) whether a reasonable 
driver would have noticed the effect their car was having on a 
neighboring autonomous vehicle and taken precautions to avoid the 
accident. Horses used to be quite common and their behaviors 
widely known. In contrast, the reasonable person may not know 
their behavior was likely to confuse an autonomous vehicle in a 
wider range of cases. 
The autonomous vehicle accident in Florida helps illustrate this 
theory.160 In the accident, a white truck against a bright sky confused 
the autonomous vehicle.161 The truck driver was charged with a right 
of way traffic violation162 but was not charged for negligently 
confusing the autonomous vehicle. Naturally, something that is as 
lawful and ordinary as driving a white truck in daylight would not 
be negligent under the horse analogy. 
B. Instrumentality of Harm 
Property owners are expected to use ordinary care in controlling 
who has access to their property.163 Owners can be liable for 
negligence if they knew, or should have known, that giving their 
property to another would create an unreasonable risk of foreseeable 
injury due to the recipient’s youth, inexperience, or other 
circumstances.164 For example, loaning a car to an unlicensed or 
intoxicated driver is negligence per se, because lack of proper skill 
or competence to drive safely is presumed.165 
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Pre-existing analogy theories cannot be sensibly applied to an 
owner of an autonomous vehicle that negligently provides access to 
another. Elevators are not easily moved, and airplanes are not 
typically borrowed without a formal contract distributing liability. 
The “reasonable car” theory analogizes autonomous vehicles with 
human beings,166 but analogies comparing humans to machines are 
limited. Elevators and autopilot are both heavily regulated.167 
Therefore, it is often quite clear whether it is reasonable to grant 
access to an elevator or autopilot to others by looking for an 
appropriate license and compliance with various regulations. 
The horse analogy theory leads to a more sensible application of 
the instrumentality of harm doctrine. Autonomous vehicles lack—
for now—some of the detailed, explicit, and widely-known 
regulatory framework of traditional cars, elevators, or airplanes.168 
In most states, there is no licensing scheme an autonomous vehicle 
owner could rely on to verify a borrower of their vehicle knows how 
to use the autonomous features safely.169 Many consumers are 
uncertain whether riding a horse or an autonomous vehicle while 
intoxicated would be considered against the law. The applicable law 
is often determined by a technical statutory interpretation of DUI 
laws, rather than by common law.170 
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Instrumentality of harm case law for horse accidents is more 
analogous to the type of situations that may emerge with 
autonomous vehicles. Horse owners can be liable if they knew or 
should have known either (1) that the rider of the horse did not have 
the skills or knowledge to ride safely, or (2) that the horse had 
particular “vicious or violent” propensities.171 If a rider tells the 
owner of a horse the rider has “some” experience, the owner may 
rely on this statement and be absolved of liability.172 A “vicious or 
violent” horse is one having a propensity (not a mere potential) to 
“endanger the safety of the persons and property of others.”173 If the 
owner warns a rider of the horse’s dangerous tendencies, and the 
person borrowing the horse rides anyway, the rider may be 
contributorily negligent or have assumed the risk.174 Even a single 
incident where a horse acted erratically could be enough to put the 
owner on notice of its dangerous propensity and impose a duty to 
warn future users of the property about the danger.175  
In Macho v. Mahowald, a single incident where a horse bolted 
towards an alfalfa patch was enough to raise a jury question as to 
whether the owner was on notice of the horse’s dangerous 
propensity.176 There, the owner offered an acquaintance a ride on his 
daughter’s horse, without providing any warnings about the horse 
bolting for an alfalfa patch, as it had on a prior occasion.177 Once the 
acquaintance was on the horse, it once again bolted towards the 
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alfalfa patch, throwing the rider against a tree in the process.178 In 
State Farm v. Shoaf, the owner of a horse was liable for negligence 
when he handed over the reins to an inexperienced rider near a busy 
street.179 There, the owner’s knowledge of the rider’s lack of 
experience, and of the particular dangers of their surroundings 
resulted in a finding of negligence on the part of the owner.180 
A hypothetical can illustrate how this case law could apply to 
autonomous vehicle owners that negligently provide their vehicle to 
another. Consider a situation in which someone loans a car they own 
to a friend, who has no experience using autonomous vehicles. The 
friend drives manually to get to the freeway, then initiates the self-
driving features near the end of the onramp. However, the friend did 
not realize the autonomous features will not engage until the GPS 
recognizes the car as being completely on the freeway, and it did not 
actually activate on the onramp. The friend stops holding the wheel 
and promptly crashes the vehicle. Here, the owner could be 
contributorily negligent for providing the instrumentality of harm to 
an inexperienced driver, without any warnings or instruction. 
C. Assumption of the Risk 
A user of a product assumes the risk if the user subjectively 
knew and appreciated the danger of an activity but voluntarily chose 
to continue in spite of the danger.181 The most important element of 
an assumption of the risk defense is that the user of the product had 
actual, subjective knowledge of the risks and their magnitude, with 
some degree of specificity.182 While the gravity of risk must be 
known, the specific manner of injury does not.183 Subjective 
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knowledge may be implied by circumstantial evidence, such as the 
user’s skill or expertise related to the activity.184 
Users of a product may have assumed the risk if they used a 
product in an unintended or unforeseeable manner.185 They also 
assume risks they acknowledge are inherent in an imperfect product 
but pose no special dangers.186 Drivers can assume the risk when 
they continue using a vehicle after a dangerous defect becomes 
known or the risks are disclosed to them.187 For example, passengers 
can assume the risk when they notice the driver is acting erratically, 
but do nothing to mitigate the danger.188 Someone that continues 
driving despite knowledge of the dangerous condition of the vehicle 
is negligent for disregarding the danger.189 
Assumption of the risk case law for horse accidents focuses on 
the behavior and mannerisms of the horse. Horseback riders assume 
the risk a particular horse may not have an “ideal” mannerism.190 
They assume risks inherent in horseback riding, such as being 
thrown from the horse.191 However, riders do not assume the risk a 
horse has particular “vicious propensities” unless they had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the special danger.192 Riders that continue 
riding their horse despite knowledge of its dangerous propensity 
may assume the risk.193  
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In comparison to horses, the more predictable and safer nature 
of autonomous vehicles may create a narrower scope of assumed 
risks. Horses may “buck, run, kick, bite, run, and bolt uncontrollably 
. . . without warning and without apparent cause.”194 Riding 
horseback is more dangerous than driving a motorcycle or skiing.195 
If an autonomous vehicle acted similarly to the horse in Hunting 
View Farm and randomly reversed into someone’s shin, the user 
probably would not be seen as having assumed the risk, because 
more predictable behavior is expected of an autonomous vehicle. 
However, overall horse case law offers a more sensible analogy 
to autonomous vehicles. Users of an autonomous vehicle may 
assume the risk of an imperfect product and may assume the risk 
when misusing the vehicle. Manufacturers may be liable when an 
autonomous vehicle product has a particular dangerous propensity 
that goes beyond the risks a consumer consents to by using the 
product. However, users may be liable if they knew of a dangerous 
defect and did nothing to avert the danger. Manufacturers can reduce 
their liability exposure by ensuring drivers have subjective 
knowledge of the risks, such as by disclosing them in the owner’s 
manual196 and in an express waiver.197 
This application of the assumption of risk doctrine is aligned 
with the Department of Transportation’s report on the fatal 
autonomous vehicle accident in Florida in which an autonomous 
vehicle collided with a truck in an intersection.198 There, the driver 
was using the vehicle’s autonomous features on “city streets” even 
though they were only intended for highway use.199 Such misuse of 
the product could constitute an assumption of the risk. Additionally, 
the vehicle’s owner’s manual gave the owner knowledge of the risk 
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that the system will not perform well in specific crash scenarios.200 
The car’s repeated warnings to the driver201 arguably gave the driver 
subjective knowledge of the dangers of failing to maintain vigilance 
over the car’s operations.202 While the vehicle could not accurately 
interpret the white truck against a bright sky,203 the driver had 
subjective knowledge of the risks that he assumed through his 
continued use of the product. 
Consumers assume the risks they know are an inherent part of 
using an imperfect product, but cannot consent to dangers that are 
unreasonable or unknown to them. Defects in autonomous vehicles 
will likely cause manufacturer liability, but autonomous vehicles 
operating within their disclosed limits of performance should not. 
D. Product Liability 
Generally, manufacturers can be strictly liable for their products 
under three possible doctrines: manufacturing defect, design defect, 
and warning defect.204 Manufacturing defects are rare in the modern 
era because modern manufacturing and software are usually mass-
produced in a manner that is consistent with design specifications.205 
A design defect occurs when a product is unreasonably dangerous 
and a reasonable safer alternative design would have mitigated the 
risk of harm.206 A warning defect occurs when a potentially 
dangerous product is negligently produced and sold without 
adequate instructions or warnings necessary to make the product 
safer or to warn the consumer of foreseeable risks.207 Manufacturers 
do not have a duty to equip the most optimal warnings possible, but 
can be liable for using a light on the dash, rather than a more 
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effective audio alert.208 Generally, more specific warnings are less 
likely to result in liability than generalized warnings that may be 
difficult to interpret.209 
The horse analogy fails when it comes to design and warning 
defects. Strict product liability only applies to products that are fixed 
in their nature, whereas a horse’s behavior may change based on its 
treatment by the owner.210 Additionally, horses are not mass 
manufactured with precision in a manner that rarely leads the horse 
to deviate from a design.211 Here, it matters that horses are blood and 
bone, whereas autonomous vehicles are steel and computer boards. 
However, design defects in autonomous vehicles require no analogy 
or breakthrough in legal analysis. They place no special burden on 
basic principles of product liability.212 Autonomous vehicle design 
defects will most likely be analyzed under the same risk-utility 
analysis as any other product.213 The Restatement of Torts includes 
a seven-factor test for product liability.214 
Despite the common prediction that autonomous vehicles will 
represent a dramatic shift towards manufacturer liability,215 the 
factors lean in favor of only mild liability for manufacturers. For 
example, the benefits of the product to society is quite significant 
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for autonomous vehicles,216 which are offering a safer alternative to 
human drivers.217 Users of an autonomous vehicle can reduce their 
exposure to the risks of the product by taking control of the vehicle 
when a crash is imminent.218 Users should be aware of the dangers 
of the product because those dangers have been widely publicized219 
and may also be in the owner’s manual220 or elsewhere. 
While the horse analogy is not sensible for product liability, a 
design defect analysis does not imply a need for novel analysis or 
analogy. Manufacturers can reduce their liability in the usual ways, 
by educating users on the risks, making products that benefit society, 
equipping users to reduce their own risks, and creating the safest 
product reasonably possible. Manufacturers will not be liable 
merely for an imperfect product, but may be if their product is 
especially dangerous such that the manufacturer was negligent. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Horses and autonomous vehicles have more in common than 
meets the eye. Both are autonomous property that can perceive their 
environment, misinterpret the dangers around them, and engage in 
maneuvers the owner would not have authorized. As a result, many 
accidents on horses and foreseeable situations for autonomous 
vehicle accidents have many analogous facts and elicit similar legal 
principles. 
The precedent for horse accidents presents a stronger 
comparison than pre-existing analogy theories for elevators, 
autopilot systems, or humans. Elevators carry no expectation of 
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oversight from its users, while autopilot systems expect 
professional, licensed oversight. Analogizing autonomous vehicles 
to human drivers is a novel legal doctrine because the reasonable 
person standard has never been applied to property. These analogies 
often become an awkward fit when considering complex real-world 
scenarios, such as loaning the car to another or other negligent 
drivers on the road. 
The horse analogy is more sensible for most situations. Horses 
and autonomous vehicles both perceive and interpret their 
environment, and they sometimes make dangerous maneuvers when 
they misunderstand their surroundings. They are both affected by 
the actions of other people on the road. Horses and autonomous 
vehicles are both property, owned and operated by regular 
consumers, that can be borrowed by a friend or used by another. 
Common law rules for product liability and negligence vary 
from state to state. The future will likely include variations in 
autonomous vehicle liability that will develop incrementally 
through the common law process. However, this Recent 
Development proposes an analogy to forecast liability rules in 
autonomous vehicle accidents. It illustrates why autonomous 
vehicles will not introduce immense liability exposure to 
manufacturers. Rather liability will continue to be imparted where it 
is due, based on the party whose negligence caused the accident. 
